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 A report published by the RAND Corporation in 1980 began, “Historians almost 
certainly will label the 1970s the decade of the terrorist,” noting that over the course of the 1970s 
the trend in the use of terrorist tactics around the world had been “unmistakably upward” 
(Jenkins). The report went on to predict that terrorism would continue during the 1980s “as a 
mode of political expression, of gaining international attention, and of achieving limited political 
goals” (Jenkins). And indeed, this is precisely what occurred over the next two decades. 
 Latin America in particular was a hotspot for terrorism. The region produced some of the 
most well-known terrorist groups outside of the Middle East, including the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Shining Path (SL) in Peru. Such groups exemplified the era’s 
Third Wave terrorism: typically based on leftist ideologies, Third Wave terrorists espoused 
rebellion against “decadent” and unequal societies (Feldmann & Perälä, 2004), combining 
guerrilla warfare tactics with terrorist operations in pursuit of political and economic change.  
Governmental counter-terrorism efforts increased in kind and were known for their 
brutal, repressive nature. The success of those counter-terrorism efforts varied from country to 
country and administration to administration. In the case of Shining Path, Peruvian president 
Alberto Fujimori’s counter-terrorism strategies and laws were initially hailed as a paragon of 
how to counter terrorism and effectively dismantle terrorist groups. However, they were later 
recognized to have been inhumane and unjust, a brutal crackdown that failed to address the root 
issues. In Colombia, initial military responses also led to human rights violations, but certain 
elements of the Colombian responses addressed political factors at play as well: throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, the government and FARC repeatedly signed peace treaties, but each treaty 
eventually fell apart. FARC has lasted longer than Shining Path, but many of its factions have 
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been transformed into a political party. Thus, the Peruvian and Colombian governments’ 
approaches yielded two different results. 
Understanding why specific strategies succeeded or failed against particular groups can 
improve understanding of the past and inform today’s counter-terrorism efforts. Unfortunately, 
there is no reason to expect that terrorism will someday disappear entirely, as it is a cost-
effective “weapon of the weak” (Enders & Sandler, 2012). While Fourth Wave terrorism has 
brought religious motivations to the forefront of terrorist organizations, studies find that other 
factors initially tied to Third Wave terrorist groups still motivate individuals to participate in 
terrorist acts or join terrorist groups (Moghaddam, 2005; Bhatia & Ghanem, 2017). In other 
cases, government “overreactions” and oppression have simply added to insecurity and violence 
and even prompted individuals to join terrorist groups (McCulloch, 2003; United Nations 
Development Programme, 2017). Therefore, understanding counter-terrorism strategies and 
terrorist goals from the past can inform counter-terrorism decisions today.  
Additionally, Enders and Sandler (2012) predict that domestic terrorism will continue to 
dominate transnational terrorism in terms of the number of incidents. While “terrorism” in 
popular culture evokes images of transnational attacks by groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda, 
domestic attacks—which are addressed differently—will continue to be more common. This 
means analysis of past methods of handling domestic terrorism will be useful moving forward. 
Accordingly, this paper investigates the counter-terrorism strategies employed against 
Colombia’s FARC and Peru’s Shining Path, analyzing the effectiveness of those strategies. It 
first explores the rise of each group and their respective goals, organization, and tactics. It then 
analyzes what counter-terrorism strategies governments implemented and those strategies’ short- 
and long-term effects. It finds that military strategies have only been somewhat effective 
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depending on the terrorist organization’s structure and have resulted in human rights abuses. 
While negotiation can be impractical if a group’s ideology is dependent on the destruction of the 
government, peace talks and negotiation processes have shown promise. However, they are often 
undermined by the military or administration. In all, the possibilities for negotiation demonstrate 
the importance of considering multifaceted counter-terrorism strategies. 
 
General Note on the Demise of Terrorist Groups 
General studies on factors leading to the decline of terrorist groups identify multiple 
elements. Audrey Cronin (2006) summarizes the general trends that have been recognized:  
There are at least seven broad explanations for, or critical elements in, the decline and 
ending of terrorist groups in the modern era: (1) capture or killing of the leader, (2) 
failure to transition to the next generation, (3) achievement of the group’s aim, (4) 
transition to a legitimate political process, (5) undermining of popular support, (6) 
repression, and (7) transition from terrorism to other forms of violence. (17-18) 
In Latin America, counter-terrorism efforts have often revolved around the military-oriented 
options listed, such as (1) the capture and killing of the leader and (6) widespread repression. 
More recently, however, there has been increasing recognition of the importance of non-military 
efforts in effective counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategies, since military efforts do 
not address many of the terrorism risk factors such as political instability (Debarre, 2018; 
Schumacher & Schraeder, 2018). Moreover, military responses can lead to civilian abuse that 
foments further terrorism and invokes questions of morality (Carr, 2003; Choi, 2011. 
Understanding the relationship between military and non-military counter-terrorism strategies is 
critical to properly evaluating past strategies and planning successful future ones. 
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Establishment and Evolution  
Both Shining Path and FARC began as leftist groups espousing the goal of fighting social 
inequality and economic injustice resulting from imperialism, government corruption, or the 
elite. They did, however, have important structural differences that contributed to the 
effectiveness (or lack thereof) of specific counter-terrorism responses. Despite using guerilla 
warfare tactics, SL functioned more as a hierarchical cult centered around the person of Abimael 
Guzmán. FARC, on the other hand, exhibited a community-based structure, using guerilla 
warfare but gaining local support through social services rather than coercion.  
 
Marxism and Social Revolution in Peru  
Establishment 
SL was founded by Abimael Guzmán in the 1960s in Ayacucho, a city in the Andes 
mountains. Guzmán was a philosophy professor-turned-radical whose interest in Marxism and 
Maoism formed the foundation of SL ideology. In particular, these ideologies influenced the 
group’s end goal of revolution through violent conflict. As a result, even though the Peruvian 
government’s official campaign to overthrow the Peruvian government did not truly begin until 
1980, the early ideological influences laid the foundation for inevitable violence between the 
government and SL. This inevitably was notable in one of Guzman’s speeches at the beginning 
of the official revolution: Guzman said, “Triumph is ours. The masses will win. The peasants 
will rise, and the proletariat will lead it…The future lies in guns and cannons! The armed 
revolution has begun! Glory to Marxist-Leninist-Mao-Zedong Thought!” (Starn, 2005). SL’s 
focus, therefore, was the establishment of a new proletariat-led state formed through armed 
struggle. 
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SL spent its early years recruiting among rural communities for two reasons. First, 
Guzmán was able to indoctrinate students through the selection of radical faculty at the 
University of Huamanga. Those students would then carry SL’s message and ideals to their 
villages, often becoming teachers themselves (McCormick, 1990). Second, many of those who 
could sympathize most deeply with the message of marginalization, inequality, and the need for 
social revolution were indigenous, Quechua-speaking groups that lived in rural, poverty-stricken 
villages. Despite this early focus on rural communities, Shining Path’s network grew to include 
both rural peasants and the urban unemployed through the use of propaganda targeted at those 
experiencing the greatest suffering and injustice under the democratic government (Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs, 2008).  
During these early years, Guzmán focused on expanding the group’s network and 
cultivating its image and ideology. This included establishing himself as the near-mythical 
leader. While few recruits ever saw Guzmán in person, he maintained an image of genius and 
power encapsulated in new members’ oaths of loyalty: they swore unconditional surrender and 
devotion to Guzmán, Shining Path, and the world proletariat revolution (McCormick, 1990; 
Starn, 2005). 
Early tactics revolved around propaganda and spreading the revolution’s message. In 
addition to individual recruitment efforts, SL began forming “front groups” that were distinct 
from SL in name but closely associated. These groups allowed SL to take advantage of the same 
democratic society and its freedoms that it sought to undermine (McCormick, 1990). However, 
the group’s foundational goal of overthrowing the Peruvian government and instituting a new 
societal order meant that tactics quickly devolved into terrorist acts.  
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Evolution 
 May 17, 1980, marked the beginning of Shining Path’s campaign to overthrow the 
government when members bombed polling stations in peasant villages and spent the next few 
months attacking “state symbols” such as police stations and national development projects 
(McCormick, 1990).  A 1987 report commissioned by the U.S. Department of State noted that 
SL became “singled out for its simple ruthlessness. Murder, dynamite bombings and arson are 
the instruments of political violence. Few terrorist groups in modern times…have employed 
high-order violence with the same determination, lack of discrimination, and widespread effect” 
(McCormick). The basic strategy was to use violence to make democratic institutions look weak, 
prevent citizen participation in local government, destroy the economy, and undermine social 
services (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2008). By doing so, SL would drive both the 
population and government to desperation, theoretically resulting in a capitulation to SL’s 
demands for an entirely new regime.  
The increasing violence appeared in SL’s evolving ideology as well. One of its main 
principles became the “quota,” the expectation and willingness to give up one’s life when the 
party demanded it (Starn, 2005). As the stakes increased, the leftist group turned on other leftists 
who did not fully support the cause: “Any person believed to be sympathetic to the government 
or to even slightly disagree with Shining Path’s fundamental beliefs was a candidate to 
be…kidnapped, tortured and/or murdered” (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2008). As the 
organization began to resemble a death cult rather than a political organization, support among 
indigenous groups and other citizens decreased (McCormick, 1987; Council on Hemispheric 
Affairs, 2008). But as support declined, fear of the increasing violence surged.  
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Communism and Self-Defense in Colombia  
Establishment 
FARC’s roots can be found in La Violencia, Colombia’s 1948-1958 civil war. La 
Violencia was “an explosive expression of peasant grievances and local conflicts” (LeoGrande & 
Sharpe, 2000) during which many peasants organized themselves into localized self-defense 
groups. Following the war, these self-defense groups transformed into local organizations based 
around particular ideologies, but they quickly began to face persecution by the new government. 
One such group was Manuel Marulanda’s Colombian Communist Party-based group, which the 
U.S.-backed Colombian military attacked on May 27, 1964, in Marquetalia. In the months 
following the attack, Marulanda’s community and surrounding communities formally organized 
and unified to “fight for better conditions for people in the countryside and to defend their 
followers from military abuses” (Farrow, 2018). FARC members firstly sought to protect 
themselves from the government. However, in a reaction against U.S. influence in the region and 
U.S. backing of the Colombian military, FARC also had ideological roots opposing “American 
imperialism” and influence in the country (Mapping Militant Organizations, 2019).  
In 1966, FARC shifted its attention from mere survival to providing educational and 
medical services, developing training programs, and planning attacks. By offering social services 
that the government failed to provide, FARC grew in strength and support. In fact, “being a 
FARC member for many was a form of social activism” (Day, 2011), a sentiment echoed by the 
community at large. In many cases, FARC’s state-like structure provided greater organization 
and services than communities had experienced from the government. FARC initially paid for 
these services (as well as training programs) through tax systems, kidnapping, and extortion of 
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politicians, soldiers, and elites. They quickly transitioned to more profitable activities and larger 
acts of terror that weakened public support for the group.  
 
Evolution 
The early 1970s saw the beginning of FARC’s use of kidnapping and extortion of 
Colombians, while the late 1970s represented a transition into more aggressive kidnapping and 
ransoms. For example, in 1977 FARC made $250,000 from the ransom of a Peace Corps 
volunteer, whom they held for three years (BBC, 2016). Later, in April 1983, FARC kidnapped a 
U.S. citizen in what the U.S. refers to as the first FARC terrorist attack against the United States 
(Mapping Militant Organizations, 2019). Throughout Colombia more generally, FARC fighters 
made everyone from politicians to priests victims of their attacks (Farrow, 2018).  
The transition to narcoterrorism—participation in drug trafficking to fund terrorist 
activities—further harmed the organization’s reputation. In 1982, FARC held an internal 
conference in which they “explicitly endorsed coca cultivation as a major source of revenue” 
(Day, 2011). A Library of Congress report (2002) estimates that 62% of FARC’s income came 
from drugs by the 1990s (Berry, Curtis, Hudson, & Kollars). While the initial boost in income 
stemming from involvement in the drug trade improved FARC’s ability to provide public 
services, the association eventually became a source of internal conflict and external criticism.  
These changes in public support, however, did not result in FARC’s demise. Terrorist 
attacks (along with intermittent peace talks that generally collapsed after a year or two) 
continued throughout the 1990s and through the 2010s, most often through kidnapping of off-
duty soldiers or foreigners and bombings of civilians, state facilities, and foreign companies. In 
August 1996, FARC took 60 soldiers hostage after attacking the Las Delicias military base, 
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where they killed 54 and wounded 17 (BBC, 2016). In 1997, the organization kidnapped a U.S. 
oil engineer and his Venezuelan pilot in Venezuela, at which point the U.S. designated FARC as 
a foreign terrorist organization (BBC, 2016; Bureau of Counterterrorism, n.d.). In the 1998 Siege 
of Miraflores, they attacked a church, hospital, and military base and kidnapped 129 police 
officers (BBC, 2016). Further attacks have continued even through the 2010s, typically through 
kidnapping, hostage-taking, and bombings. 
Counter-Terrorism and Short-Run Effectiveness  
 At the time of Shining Path prominence in Peru and the growth of FARC in Colombia, 
both countries were democracies. As a result, they faced a challenge common to democracies 
facing rising terrorism: the balance between responding too passively and responding too 
aggressively. Both countries—at least early on—tended toward harsh military responses that 
resulted in widespread human rights abuses and alienation of the public. 
 
Aggressive Military Response 
Peru 
The Peruvian government’s aggressive response escalated with time. In 1983, President 
Belaúnde (1980–1985) imposed martial law, suspending civil liberties and allowing police to 
seize suspected SL members for up to ten days without presenting charges (Schumacher, 1983; 
Associated Press, 1984). The suspension of civil rights resulted in significant abuses and made 
1983 and 1984 years of terror. Some documents report decaying bodies floating down rivers in 
the Apurimac Valley daily with death tolls of over 1,000 (Starn, 2005). In 1985, President Alan 
Garcia assumed the presidency. Despite the change in leadership, terror prevailed: he, too, used 
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intimidation, torture, and random assassination to eliminate any citizens perceived as SL 
sympathizers—including many who were in fact not “sympathizers”.  
In 1990, yet another change in leadership occurred as Alberto Fujimori assumed the 
presidency. That same year, an analyst at the RAND Corporation noted that many believed a 
coup might be the only way to defeat SL. He predicted that a coup would “result in an immediate 
crackdown on public demonstrations and a stepped up, unrestrained campaign against Shining 
Path,” noting that “organized violence” would initially decrease but that the repressive counter-
terrorism actions taken by the military would lead to further violence and the “polarization of 
Peruvian society” (McCormick, 1990). Additionally, he recognized that for the counter-terrorism 
campaign to be successful, “the army would have to kill or incarcerate SL members and 
sympathizers at a faster rate than SL was generating them,” which would certainly raise ethical 
concerns (McCormick, 1990).  
The predictions were strikingly accurate. In 1992, Fujimori performed an autogolpe—a 
self-coup in which he suspended Congress and effectively declared himself dictator. Ruling by 
command, he passed a series of extreme anti-terrorism laws, permitting the military to murder 
and assassinate those even remotely suspected of sympathizing with SL. Thousands of innocent 
citizens were arrested, judged in military courts, and sentenced to 20 years in inhumane prison 
conditions (Human Rights Watch, 1996; Starn, 2005). Fujimori also placed Vladimiro 
Montesinos, a member of the National Intelligence Service, as leader of extrajudicial death 
squads that massacred terrorists and civilians alike.  
Disturbingly, the government’s extreme measures that persecuted innocent citizens 
seemed to be effective in neutralizing SL terrorist attacks. While SL terrorism had been 
increasing steadily throughout the 1980s, the capture of Abimael Guzmán and other leaders in 
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1992 (facilitated by the government’s widespread oppression of citizens) largely debilitated SL 
and resulted in a prompt decrease in violence. SL regrouped relatively quietly under a new 
leader, Commandante Feliciano, and resumed violent attacks in 1995 (Feldmann & Perälä, 
2004). However, Feliciano’s arrest in 1999 effectively marked the end of SL’s power. President 
Fujimori’s antiterrorist program was, in the short run, “successful.” With the world still unaware 
of the rampant human rights abuses that laid the foundation of Fujimori’s antiterrorist program, 
many praised his strategy for dismantling a terrorist organization.   
 
Colombia 
 From the beginning of the Colombian civil conflict in 1964, Colombian military 
organizations were the dominating force for dealing with insurgency and terrorist groups. 
Paramilitary death squads were formed in the 1980s and 1990s primarily in response to the 
growing violence perpetrated by terrorist groups. Many of these paramilitary groups were armed 
by the government, and all were brutally violent against confirmed terrorists and regular citizens 
alike. One such group was Muerte a Secuestradores (MAC), which originally formed to prevent 
kidnappings of the wealthy. MAC quickly became an extralegal extension of the army and 
eventually brought a halt to the 1999 peace talks with FARC by killing over 700 FARC members 
attempting to begin participation in the political process (Farrow, 2018). Such military-based 
increases in violence led to further fractionalization of society, which in turn fostered mistrust 
and greater violence. 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, civilian executions climbed as “the army took on FARC 
rebels with renewed fury…to demonstrate progress to a frustrated public, and to its American 
financiers” (Farrow, 2018). Researchers found that approximately half of Colombian 
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commanders trained by the U.S. during this time period were in charge of units whose members 
committed extrajudicial killings or were eventually charged with another major crime (Farrow). 
Of course, a country that does not employ any force in responding to terrorist attacks alienates a 
public that feels unprotected and fosters further violence; the problem is when government force 
goes too far. A 1994 cable from American Embassy Bogota warns of “body count mentalities” 
among army brigades seeking to create “track records of aggressive anti-guerrilla activity” 
without oversight. A CIA intelligence report from the same year notes that Colombian security 
forces often used death squad tactics, assassinated civilians in guerrilla-associated areas, and 
killed prisoners (Farrow). In short, the pressure to beat FARC and other terrorist groups 
encouraged government forces to violate human rights in order to create an illusion of successful 
counter-terrorism activity.  
The U.S. influence in this push toward violence is striking. Investigative journalist Ronan 
Farrow (2018) reports that in Plan Colombia, which was conceived between Colombia and the 
U.S. in 1998 and 1999 and signed in 2000, “Colombia wanted a 70-30 social-military split; the 
United States wanted the reverse. [Despite Colombian wishes,] the first year more than 70 
percent of the funds went to military and police assistance.” The U.S. push for financing groups 
that demonstrated the most “progress” in fighting guerrilla and terrorist groups thereby 




 It is important to note that the Peruvian government was not necessarily opposed to 
negotiation with Shining Path. Presidents Belaunde and García both called for discussion during 
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their respective administrations (McCormick, 1990). In each case, SL stated that the end of the 
conflict would only come when the Peruvian government surrendered power entirely. In the 
words of Abimael Guzmán, “You sign [the documents of surrender] at the bargaining table” (as 
cited in McCormick). SL’s case demonstrates the importance of a group’s ideology. While SL 
appealed to social and economic issues facing those marginalized by the government for 
recruitment, the ideological core of the group was based on creation of an entirely new order. 
The foundation was not just a response to failures of the government; it inherently opposed the 
structure of the government, handicapping the ability of the government to negotiate. The 
situation sheds additional light on why a country or administration might feel driven to commit 
extreme human rights violations in the fight against a terrorist organization: if it cannot address 
the foundational issues with which the group is concerned, it may feel it has no other option in 
the face of escalating violence. Indeed, there might not be many other options. 
 
Colombia 
Unlike Shining Path, which demanded destruction of the state, FARC was largely “a 
political movement pushing socialist reorganization of the country” (Farrow, 2018). 
Reorganization is, of course, different than destruction. It implies that the government might be 
able to address the concerns leading the rebel group to call for reorganization. For this reason, 
Farrow notes that Plan Colombia’s “greatest successes . . . came only as the balance of military 
and civilian assistance evened, and U.S. and Colombian officials began to recognize the value of 
rebuilding the country’s long-suffering institutions” (Farrow, 2018). In other words, civilian 
assistance and rebuilding the country’s institutions helped address some of FARC’s grievances. 
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As a result, the ongoing call for discussion and negotiation lasted far longer than it did in 
Peru: “Every Colombian president since Belisario Betancur…has recognized the need to find a 
political solution to the insurgency” (LeoGrande & Sharpe, 2000) rather than a military one. In 
1982, President Betancur began peace talks that led to the Uribe Accords and a ceasefire in 1984. 
The accords established the Patriotic Union (UP), a joint party made up of FARC and Colombian 
Communist Party members. The UP was successful, and its successful establishment has been 
encouraging for counter-terrorism efforts given that “transition to a legitimate political process” 
is one of the elements factoring into the decline of terrorist groups (Cronin, 2006). 
Unfortunately, Colombian army and paramilitaries undermined this success by assassinating UP 
leaders, including a presidential candidate (Mapping Militant Organizations, 2019). A second 
pass was made at peace talks in 1991, but the talks fell apart after about a year. In 1999, 
Colombian President Pastrana and FARC leader Marulanda announced the start of negotiations 
and large swaths of the country were demilitarized. However, in 2002, rebels hijacked a 
domestic flight, ending the 1999 negotiations. Overall, peace talks and discussions have met with 
apparent successes undermined by violence from government organizations or, in some cases, 
the rebels themselves. As a result, in the short-term Colombia’s negotiations at times appeared 
more successful than the military oppression in Peru and at other times far less so.  
A notable challenge for the peace accords has stemmed from the structure of the 
organization. Unlike SL, FARC was not based around the leadership of one individual. On the 
one hand, this distinction contributed to the government’s ability negotiate with FARC, as 
military action against FARC leaders would be less effective. On the other hand, it meant some 
factions within FARC have continued—even through today, though to a minimal extent—to 
perpetrate violence despite broader ceasefires. 
14




 In the short term, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori was hailed as a hero who 
successfully dismantled a terrorist organization. In the long term, vast human right abuses 
surfaced, and Fujimori was convicted of ordering civilian massacres through death squads, 
among other charges (Cespedes & Wade, 2009). Frighteningly, despite the human rights abuses, 
his strategy did seem to work in that Shining Path never returned to its previous levels of 
“success.” In 2020, analysts found that “Shining Path no longer represents a serious threat for the 
Peruvian state” (InSight Crime, 2020). At the same time, the violence of the state resulted in 
rampant injustice for many civilians and caused as many deaths as the terrorist group itself, if not 
more.  
 In Colombia, FARC lasted longer, and some distantly connected fringe groups remain 
active as rebel groups. However, the incorporation of FARC into the political system and the 
signing of a peace deal in 2016 have been promising signs for the possibility of responding to 
terrorist groups without overt government repression. Admittedly, peace continues to be 
somewhat shaky, as there are still militant factions connected to the original FARC taking up 
arms. While some FARC members simply refused to demobilize, many of the violent factions 
are rising in response to a perceived government failure to fulfill promises in the peace treaty 
(Casey, 2019). Moreover, these challenges in the peace process are small in comparison with the 
massive civilian costs that preceded the treaty.  
 While it can be instinctual to respond to terrorism with greater force and violence, the 
results of a militarized response are often human rights abuses that can equal or surpass the 
original abuses perpetrated by the terrorists. While a group’s ideology may prevent negotiation 
efforts from succeeding, the consequences of unconstrained military action reinforce the 
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importance of pursuing multifaceted, government-wide approaches to counter-terrorism beyond 
mere force. Colombia’s experience with FARC, though it is ongoing, suggests there is hope for 
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